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Attorney General Robert 
Jackson’s Brief Encounter with 
the Notion of Preclusive 
Presidential Power 
 
William R. Casto* 
 
Justice Robert H. Jackson‟s concurring opinion in the Steel 
Seizure case1 is the best judicial2 opinion ever written on the 
vexing question of the President‟s constitutional power over 
foreign affairs.3  His opinion does not resolve specific problems 
that arise, but it provides a valuable framework for organizing 
analyses.  The opinion has become the most influential 
pronouncement on the concurrent foreign affairs powers of the 
President and Congress.4  His analysis in Steel Seizure drew 
 
* Paul Whitfield Horn Professor, Texas Tech University.  The present 
essay presents a small facet of my on-going, comprehensive study of the role 
of attorneys in advising President Roosevelt on the 1940 Destroyers-for-Bases 
Deal. 
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 
634 (1952). 
2. An early essay by Alexander Hamilton is equally valuable.  See 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Pacificus No. 1 (1793), in 15 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 40 (H. Syrett ed., 1969).  See also WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL, at chs. 5, 10 
(2006).  Jackson‟s and Hamilton‟s essays, though separated by one and a half 
centuries, mesh well together to form a complete understanding of the 
allocation of foreign affairs powers under the Constitution.  See id. at ch. 10.  
This compatibility is not surprising.  Jackson was a gifted Supreme Court 
Justice, and by any standard, Hamilton was one of the five best 
constitutional theorists in our nation‟s history.  In my mind, Hamilton and 
James Madison are at the top, with John Marshall very closely behind.  As 
for the next two, I will let the readers pick. 
3. Jackson‟s model is ably discussed in MICHAEL GLENNON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 8-15 (1990); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 94-96 (2d ed. 1996); and HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA 
AFFAIR 107-13 (1990). 
4. “Justice Jackson‟s concurrence in Youngstown . . . has been very 
influential.  Indeed, courts and commentators often give more weight to 
Jackson‟s concurrence than to the majority opinion.”  CURTIS A. BRADLEY & 
JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 174 (2d ed. 2006).  See also 
1
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upon his practical experience as Attorney General of the 
United States advising President Roosevelt on the eve of the 
country‟s entrance into World War II. 
Justice Jackson‟s most famous opinion as Attorney General 
was his advice in the summer of 1940, that the President could 
trade fifty over-age destroyers to Great Britain in exchange for 
base rights in the West Indies and Canada.5  Jackson had to 
navigate through a complex set of statutes specifically designed 
to limit the transfer of warships to belligerent nations while 
the United States was neutral.  The political stakes in this 
episode were high.  President Roosevelt believed that Great 
Britain‟s very survival was at stake and, perhaps with a smile,6 
told Jackson that if the legal problems were not cleared up, 
Jackson‟s “head will have to fall.”7  At about this same time, 
 
STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 47 (4th ed. 2006); THOMAS M. 
FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
LAW 28 (2d ed. 1993); HENKIN, supra note 3, at 94.  See, e.g., Medellin v. 
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (“Justice Jackson‟s familiar tripartite scheme 
provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this 
area.”); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981). 
5. Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age 
Destroyers, 39 Op. Att‟y Gen. 484 (1940).  DAVID REYNOLDS, THE CREATION OF 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE 1937-41: A STUDY IN COMPETITIVE 
COOPERATION, at chs. 4, 5 (1982) is the best overall treatment of the deal 
because Reynolds does a superb job of placing the deal in the overall context 
of Anglo-American relations.  Another excellent treatment that is especially 
good in giving the reader the British perspective is JAMES R. LEUTZE, 
BARGAINING FOR SUPREMACY: ANGLO-AMERICAN NAVAL COLLABORATION 1937-
1941 (1977).  Two valuable and more narrowly focused studies are PHILIP 
GOODHART, FIFTY SHIPS THAT SAVED THE WORLD: THE FOUNDATION OF THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE (1965) and ROBERT SHOGAN, HARD BARGAIN: HOW 
FDR TWISTED CHURCHILL‟S ARM, EVADED THE LAW, AND CHANGED THE ROLE OF 
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1999).  Shogan‟s Hard Bargain is thoroughly 
researched and extremely well-grounded in original sources, but the author‟s 
analysis is flawed by naïve understandings of politics and of law.  WILLIAM L. 
LANGER & S. EVERETT GLEASON, THE CHALLENGE TO ISOLATION, 1937-1940 
(1952) is still valuable.  The recent chapter-length treatment in IAN 
KERSHAW, FATEFUL CHOICES: TEN DECISIONS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD, 1940-
1941, at ch. 5 (2007) is good but largely derivative.  The treatment in 
LLEWELLYN WOODWARD, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
84-92 (1962) is quite dry and relatively uninformative. 
6. OWEN WISTER, THE VIRGINIAN: A HORSEMAN OF THE PLAINS 24 (1919) 
(“When you call me that, smile.”). 
7. Roosevelt told this to the Canadian Prime Minister in a telephone 
conversation, and the Prime Minister recounted the story to U.S. Ambassador 
Moffat that same day.  Moffat recorded that the Prime Minister said that 
Roosevelt assured him that: 
 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/15
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Jackson considered the idea that “In view of [the President‟s] 
constitutional power as Chief Executive and as Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy . . . the Congress could not by 
statute limit [his] authority.”8  If this were so, there would be 
no legal impediment to the transaction. 
A little over a decade later, Justice Jackson wrote in Steel 
Seizure that presidential actions related to foreign affairs could 
be organized into three categories.  In crafting these categories, 
Jackson consciously drew upon his experiences as Attorney 
General advising President Roosevelt.9  The first category 
involves action taken “pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress.”10  In such a situation, lawful 
presidential power “is at its maximum, for it includes all that 
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can 
delegate.”11  When the President acts pursuant to congressional 
authority, “the strongest of presumptions and the widest 
latitude of judicial interpretation” would be used to support the 
lawfulness of the President‟s actions.12 
Jackson‟s second category recognizes the concept of 
concurrent presidential and congressional authority.  If 
Congress has neither delegated nor denied authority to the 
 
[A] way out of legal difficulties, which had been blocking 
him, had at last been found.  At least if it hadn‟t, continued 
the President, one of the heads now in the room (Attorney 
General, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy and 
the Acting Secretary of State) will have to fall. 
 
46 JAY PIERREPONT MOFFAT, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS (Aug. 22, 1940) (on file with 
Harvard College Library). 
8. Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion (Aug. 1940), in BENJAMIN V. 
COHEN PAPERS, 1902-1983 (on file with the Library of Congress, Washington 
D.C.), reprinted infra at app. pp. 383-95. 
9. Jackson‟s opening sentence was clearly autobiographical: “That 
comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both practical 
advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress anyone who has 
served as legal advisor to a President in time of transition and public 
anxiety.”  Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
He continued, “While an interval of detached reflection,” i.e., about a decade, 
“may temper teachings of that experience, they probably are a more realistic 
influence on my views than the conventional materials of judicial decision 
which seem unduly to accentuate doctrine and legal fiction.”  Id. (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
10. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
11. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring). 
12. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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President, “he can only rely upon his own independent powers, 
but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may 
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is 
uncertain.”13  Jackson confined his discussion of the second 
category to a single, brief paragraph because he believed that 
the President‟s action in Steel Seizure was contrary to the will 
of Congress.14  In practice, this second category, or “zone of 
twilight,” has become very significant. 
Jackson‟s third category involves presidential “measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.”15  
In this situation, the President‟s “power is at its lowest ebb, for 
then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers 
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter.”16  In other words, courts “can sustain exclusive 
Presidential control in such a case only be disabling the 
Congress from acting upon the subject.”17 
For many years, discussions of the president‟s 
constitutional authority have centered upon Jackson‟s second 
category to the virtual exclusion of his third category.18  In 
recent years, however, the Bush II Administration‟s 
pretentions to a broad expanse of plenary, unreviewable 
constitutional power has sparked interest in the third category.  
Professors David Barron and Martin Lederman have addressed 
this issue with considerable thoughtfulness and care.19  They 
followed Jackson‟s diction and described the range of plenary, 
unreviewable presidential power as a preclusive authority.20 
In 1940, a decade earlier, Jackson had to determine 
whether Congress had authorized the President to sell the 
destroyers to Great Britain.  If so, the problem fit into the first 
 
13. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring). 
14. Id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
15. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
16. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring). 
17. Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
18. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in 
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original 
Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 698-99 (2008). 
19. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in 
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 
(2008); Barron & Lederman, supra note 18. 
20. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(“Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be 
scrutinized with caution”); Barron & Lederman, supra note 18, at 720-29. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/15
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Steel Seizure category, and therefore the President obviously 
would have had authority to transfer them.  But strong 
arguments could be made that acts of Congress forbade the 
transfer.21  Jackson later admitted, “I should readily agree that 
a respectable argument against [my] conclusion could have 
been made.”22  Such an interpretation would have moved the 
problem into the third Steel Seizure category.  If the President 
has plenary constitutional authority over foreign affairs, which 
the preliminary draft advanced, the President could ignore the 
apparently applicable acts of Congress.  This very argument of 
plenary—indeed, dictatorial—powers has been more recently 
advanced by attorneys advising President Bush.23 
The present essay considers Attorney General Jackson‟s 
encounter with plenary constitutional power in the Destroyers-
for-Bases Deal.  First, the essay describes the Deal‟s political 
and diplomatic context.24  Next, the essay considers the legal 
context in which the argument for plenary power occurred.25  
Finally, the essay considers possible explanations for why 
Jackson deleted the argument from his final opinion.26 
 
AIDING GREAT BRITAIN 
 
Although World War II began in Europe in the early fall of 
1939, the German army did not bring its blitzkrieg to the 
western front until the next summer.  In May and June of 
 
21. See Edwin Borchard, The Attorney General’s Opinion on the 
Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases, 34 AM. J. INT‟L L. 690 (1940); Herbert 
W. Briggs, Neglected Aspects of the Destroyer Deal, 34 AM. J. INT‟L L. 569 
(1940); Edward Corwin, Letter to the Editor, Executive Authority Held 
Exceeded in Destroyer Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1940, at 72.  See also Letter 
from Quincy Wright to Charles C. Burlingham (Aug. 21, 1940), in BENJAMIN 
V. COHEN PAPERS, supra note 8. 
22. Robert Houghwout Jackson, Untitled Preliminary Draft, at 47 (Oct. 
10, 1952), in ROBERT HOUGHWOUT JACKSON PAPERS (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.). 
23. See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Addicott, Efficacy of the Obama Policies to 
Combat Al-Qa’eda, the Taliban, and Associated Forces—The First Year, 30 
PACE L. REV. 340, 342-53 (discussing Bush Administration policies on al-
Qa‟eda, the Taliban, and associated forces).  See also generally Steven D. 
Schwinn, The State Secrets Privilege in the Post-9/11 Era, 30 PACE L. REV. 
778 (2010). 
24. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 34-92 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text. 
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1940, the Wehrmacht quickly conquered the Low Countries 
and France, and drove the British army from the continent.  At 
about the same time, Italy entered the war, and Great Britain 
stood alone against “Hitler‟s gospel of hatred, appetite and 
domination.”27  Many believed that Britain would either 
negotiate a peace28 or be conquered through invasion. 
Invasion seemed imminent, and only the English Channel, 
patrolled by the Royal Navy, stood between Britain and the 
triumphant Germans.  At the same time, the Navy had to 
protect shipping from submarine attacks.29  Destroyers were 
absolutely essential to both of these tasks, and the British 
simply did not have enough of them.  Defending against an 
invasion was the highest priority bar none, and the Admiralty 
allocated a little more than half of their North Atlantic 
destroyers to this task.30  This absolutely essential allocation 
left too few destroyers to protect shipping.31 
Almost as soon as Churchill became Prime Minister in the 
middle of May, he began besieging President Roosevelt to lend 
or sell destroyers to the British.32  In a “jigsaw puzzle”33 of 
 
27. Winston Churchill, War of the Unknown Warrior Speech (BBC 
television broadcast, July 14, 1940) (transcript available at 
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-
churchill/126-war-of-the-unknown-warriors).  See also 2 CHURCHILL WAR 
PAPERS 516-17 (Martin Gilbert ed., 1995). 
28. The British Cabinet gave serious thought to a negotiated peace in 
late May.  See LEUTZE, supra note 5, at ch. 4; KERSHAW, supra note 5, at ch. 1; 
REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 103-06. 
29. See 1 S.W. ROSKILL, THE WAR AT SEA 1939-1945, at 249-57 (1954). 
30. See id. at 249, 253.  The British anticipated that destroyers would be 
the primary weapon against a cross-channel invasion.  Winston Churchill to 
General Ironsides and General Gill (July 10, 1940), 2 CHURCHILL WAR 
PAPERS, supra note 27, at 496. 
31. Although the Germans had only a few U-boats operational in the 
summer of 1940, their assault upon the relatively unprotected British 
shipping was devastating.  See ROSKILL, supra note 29, at 253, 348-52, 357.  
The German U-boat veterans later remembered this short period as “the 
happy time.”  Id. at 348. 
32. Telegram from Winston Churchill to Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
(May 15, 1940), in 6 MARTIN GILBERT, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: FINEST HOUR 
1939-1941, at 346 (1983) (stating that “[i]mmediate needs are: [f]irst of all, 
the loan of 40 or 50 of your older destroyers”). 
33. Robert H. Jackson, The Exchange of Destroyers for Atlantic Bases 
(1954), in THAT MAN: AN INSIDER‟S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 82, 
82 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003).  Jackson died before he could publish this 
manuscript.  It is reprinted in Professor Barrett‟s marvelous book. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/15
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intricate discussions that lasted three months, Roosevelt 
agreed to sell the British fifty destroyers for base rights.  
Jackson‟s legal opinion was a sine qua non for the Deal, but the 
opinion did not spring full-grown from his forehead. 
 
THE LEGAL CONTEXT 
 
In assessing the President‟s power, Jackson had to address 
a number of related statutes that appeared to bar the deal.  In 
June, Jackson had given an informal opinion34 that a section of 
the Espionage Act of 191735 forbade the transfer of twenty PT 
boats to the British.36  Many people thought that the Espionage 
Act similarly prohibited the transfer of destroyers.37 
To complicate the matter further, when the planned PT 
boat transfer came to light and rumors began circulating that 
the government might also sell destroyers to the British, 
Congress passed two statutes—the Walsh Amendment38 and 
the Vinson Amendment39—to outlaw the contemplated 
transfer.40  These two statutes, coupled with the Espionage Act, 
led the President and his Cabinet to believe that the Destroyer 
Deal would require specific congressional approval.41 
 
34. Id. at 94. 
35. Act of June 15, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 33 (1940), repealed 1948, re-codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 964 
(2006)).  The Espionage Act of 1917 originated as an “Omnibus Bill” that 
collected many related and unrelated provisions dealing with war and 
neutrality.  See id.  See also Letter from Lawrence Smith to Attorney General 
Jackson (June 21, 1940), in ROBERT HOUGHWOUT JACKSON PAPERS, supra note 
22. 
36. Jackson, supra note 22.  Jackson‟s precise advice on the PT boat 
transfer is in the Assistant Navy Secretary‟s notes of a telephone 
conversation with Newman Townsend, Jackson‟s assistant.  Memorandum of 
Telephone Conversation Between Townsend and Acting Secretary Compton 
(June 24, 1940) (on file with the National Archives, Washington, D.C.). 
37. See WHITNEY SHEPARDSON & WILLIAM SCROGGS, THE UNITED STATES 
IN WORLD AFFAIRS: AN ACCOUNT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1940, at 
259 (1941).  See also MARK LINCOLN CHADWIN, THE HAWKS OF WORLD WAR II, 
at 87 (1968); H. DUNCAN HALL, NORTH AMERICAN SUPPLY 142 (1955). 
38. An Act to Expedite National Defense, and for Other Purposes, Pub. 
L. No. 76-671, § 14, 54 Stat. 676, 681 (1940). 
39. Act of July 19, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-757, § 7, 54 Stat. 779, 780 
(regarding the composition of the United States Navy). 
40. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text. 
41. Memorandum from Franklin D. Roosevelt (Aug. 2, 1940), in 3 
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1940, at 58 
7
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Others believed that, notwithstanding the three statutes, 
the President had unilateral authority to accomplish the 
exchange.  In early July, private citizens and Justice Felix 
Frankfurter asked Benjamin V. Cohen to consider the issue.42  
Cohen held a relatively obscure position in the Department of 
the Interior,43 but he was generally considered the most 
brilliant lawyer in government.44  Jackson described him as 
“having the best legal brain he ha[d] ever come in contact 
with.”45  Cohen wrote a long memorandum presenting a buffet 
of powerful and not so powerful legal analyses supporting the 
transfer of destroyers to Britain.46  The President, however, 
initially rejected Cohen‟s arguments.47 
On August 2, Roosevelt and his Cabinet reached a policy 
consensus that the fifty destroyers should be transferred to the 
British, but they still believed that legislative action would be 
necessary.48  To break this logjam, Justice Frankfurter 
arranged for Cohen and Dean Acheson to refine and polish 
Cohen‟s original memorandum.49  Acheson was a capable 
attorney in private practice who later became Secretary of 
 
(U.S. Department of State ed., 1958) [hereinafter 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS]. 
42. See CHADWIN, supra note 37, at 89, 97. 
43. He was General Counsel of the National Power Policy Committee.  
See WILLIAM LASSER, BENJAMIN V. COHEN: ARCHITECT OF THE NEW DEAL 3, 
107, 247 (2002). 
44. See id. at 3. 
45. 3 HAROLD ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE 
LOWERING CLOUDS, 1939-1941, at 656 (1954) (June 22, 1941 entry quoting 
Jackson).  Similarly, New Dealer and later Supreme Court Justice William O. 
Douglas had thought that “Ben was the best and most intelligent man in the 
New Deal.”  WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 
369 (1974). 
46. Memorandum from Benjamin Cohen Regarding Sending Effective 
Material Aid to Great Britain with Particular References to the Sending of 
Destroyers (July 20, 1940), in FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT PAPERS (on file 
with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde 
Park, N.Y.) [hereinafter Memorandum from Benjamin Cohen]. 
47. See Letter from President Roosevelt to Navy Secretary Knox (July 
22, 1940), in 2 F.D.R.: HIS PERSONAL LETTERS 1928-1945, at 1048-49 (Elliot 
Roosevelt ed., 1950). 
48. See LANGER & GLEASON, supra note 5, at 749-51. 
49. DEAN ACHESON, MORNING AND NOON 222 (1965); BRUCE ALLEN 
MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL 
ACTIVITIES OF TWO SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 210 (1982) (discussing a 
Benjamin Cohen interview). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/15
372 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
State.50  The two men went to work, and on August 11, 
published their redraft in the New York Times.51  As soon as 
the Cohen/Acheson letter appeared, Jackson asked Assistant 
Solicitor General Newman A. Townsend52 to brief the letter, 
and two days later, Townsend told Jackson that he was 
“inclined to agree with the construction which the Times article 
gives to . . . the Espionage Act.”53  Townsend also thought, 
notwithstanding the Vinson and Walsh Amendments, that the 
destroyers could be sold under Sections 491 and 492 of Title 34 
of the United States Code.54  Jackson then gave the President a 
tentative green light to transfer the destroyers without specific 
legislative approval,55 and the President made a tentative offer 
to the British that same day.56 
 
JACKSON‟S OPINION 
 
Jackson informally advised President Roosevelt that the 
deal could be consummated without specific congressional 
approval, and the United States concluded a formal agreement 
with Great Britain on September 2.57  Jackson‟s formal opinion, 
 
50. See DAVID MCLELLAN, DEAN ACHESON: THE STATE DEPARTMENT YEARS 
(1976). 
51. Dean Acheson et.al., Letter to the Editor, No Legal Bar Seen to 
Transfer of Destroyers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1940, at 58.  Cohen did not sign 
the Times letter.  Instead, it was signed by Acheson and three other members 
of the WASP establishment, Charles C. Burlingham, Thomas D. Thacher, 
and George Rublee.  Id. 
52. Jackson described Townsend as “a hard-headed, conservative, and 
forthright former judge.”  Jackson, supra note 33, at 95. 
53. Memorandum from Newman A. Townsend to the Attorney General 
Regarding Over-Age Destroyers (Aug. 13, 1940), in ROBERT HOUGHWOUT 
JACKSON PAPERS, supra note 22 [hereinafter Memorandum from Newman A. 
Townsend]. 
54. Id.  With regard to Sections 491 and 492, Townsend wrote, “It may 
be, however, that immediate release and sale of the over-age destroyers could 
be accomplished under sections 491 and 492 of title 34, U.S.C.”  Id. 
55. Jackson later wrote that on the same day, “I advised the president of 
Judge Townsend‟s conclusion, which seemed to me sound.”  Jackson, supra 
note 22, at 30-31.  Jackson‟s final draft of this sentence reads, “Of course, I 
told the President of this development.”  Jackson, supra note 33, at 96. 
56. GILBERT, supra note 32, at 732-33. 
57. The agreement was accomplished through an exchange of notes 
between the British Ambassador and the Secretary of State.  See 
Memorandum from British Ambassador to Secretary of State (Sept. 2, 1940), 
in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 41, at 73; Memorandum from Secretary 
9
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which he finished at the end of the month, began with the 
technical issue of whether the President had authority to 
acquire the offered bases.  In this regard, no act of Congress 
gave the President authority, and no Act barred the President 
from acquiring the bases.  Using Jackson‟s subsequent Steel 
Seizure analysis, the issue of the President‟s authority to 
acquire base rights fell into the second category or “zone of 
twilight.”  In this context, a Preliminary Draft of the opinion58 
argues that the President has a general constitutional 
authority to act in the field of foreign relations as he sees fit.  
“Eminent authorities,” the draft states, “have long held that in 
the field of foreign relations the Executive‟s power is both 
complete and exclusive.”59  To support this proposition, the 
draft quotes Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, President 
Theodore Roosevelt, Professor John Pomeroy, and Chief Justice 
John Marshall, followed by a daunting string cite of fifteen 
relevant—and not so relevant—books, debates, a law review 
article, and a case.60  This portion of the Preliminary Draft 
concludes with a quotation from Justice Sutherland‟s Curtiss-
Wright opinion.61  Except for the draft‟s loose reference to a 
“complete and exclusive” presidential power, this first part of 
the draft is uncontroversial.  To repeat, this portion deals with 
the “zone of twilight” in which there is no conflict between the 
President and Congress.62 
 
of State to British Ambassador (Sept. 2, 1940), in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
supra note 41, at 74 (1958). 
58. Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion, supra note 8.  See app. infra 
at pp. 383-395. 
59. Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion, supra note 8; app. infra at 
pp. 383-84. 
60. Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion, supra note 8; app. infra at 
pp. 384-88. 
61. Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion, supra note 8; app. infra at 
note 124 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 
304, 319 (1936)). 
62. Almost a year later, Jackson considered whether the President could 
authorize the Army Air Corps to train British military flying students.  
Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att‟y Gen. 
58 (1941).  In that context, he quoted a constitutional law treatise that 
addressed the President‟s authority as Commander-in-Chief: 
 
[I]n virtue of his rank as head of the forces, he has certain 
powers and duties with which Congress cannot interfere.  
For instance, he may regulate the movements of the army 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/15
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Although Congress had not spoken to the issue of the 
President‟s authority to acquire territory, it clearly had 
addressed the President‟s authority to dispose of Navy vessels.  
The Walsh and Vinson Amendments were enacted specifically 
to restrict the President‟s authority to transfer destroyers to 
the British.63  The Walsh Amendment forbade a transfer unless 
the destroyers were not essential to national defense.64  The 
Vinson Amendment provided that “No [Navy] vessel . . . shall 
be disposed of by sale or otherwise . . . except as now provided 
by law,”65 and the Amendment‟s clear legislative history 
limited the President‟s authority to two specific statutory 
 
and the stationing of them at various posts.  So also he may 
direct the movements of the vessels of the navy, sending 
them wherever in his judgment it is expedient. 
 
Id. at 61 (quoting HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115 (3d ed. 1910)).  In support of this proposition, Mr. 
Black, who incidentally was the original author of Black’s Law Dictionary, 
offered three obscure opinions from the United States Court of Claims.  
BLACK, supra, at 115 n.15.  In Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173 (1893), 
the court held that the President had implied constitutional authority to 
convene a military court martial, and noted that Congress had not sought to 
deprive the President of this convening authority.  The other two cases Black 
cited were “see also” authority, in which the court gave little or no express 
consideration to the possibility of implied power, and simply enforced the 
applicable acts of Congress.  See id. (citing Hogan v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 
158 (1909); Cloud v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 69 (1907)). 
Notwithstanding the quotation from Black, there was not the slightest 
hint of a collision of congressional and presidential wills in the pilot-training 
situation.  Jackson pointed out that the recently enacted Lend-Lease Act, Act 
of Mar. 11, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-11, 55 Stat. 31 (1941), clearly gave the 
President authority to use military equipment to train the British pilots, but 
was technically silent on providing instruction services rather than training 
equipment.  Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. 
Att‟y Gen. at 60-61.  He also noted the Act‟s legislative history that included a 
clear statement that “our national policy is and should be . . . for our national 
security, to aid Britain.”  Id. at 62 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 77-18, at 2 (1941)). 
In other words, the Pilot Training issue involved a situation in which the 
President was proposing to act in accord with very recently stated 
congressional policy.  Therefore, the case fell within category two of Jackson‟s 
subsequent Steel Seizure model, or perhaps even within category one.  
Jackson stated in this regard, “I am inclined to the opinion that such action is 
likewise authorized by the Lend-Lease Act.”  Id. at 60-61.  See also id. at 62-
63 (presenting a strong statutory basis for Jackson‟s inclination). 
63. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
64. An Act to Expedite National Defense, and for Other Purposes, Pub. 
L. No. 76-671, § 14(a), 54 Stat. 676, 681 (1940). 
65. Act of July 19, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-757, § 7, 54 Stat. 779, 780 (1940). 
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modes of sale.66  The first was Sections 491 and 492 of Title 34 
of the United States Code, which allowed the Navy to strike 
“vessels . . . unfit for further service” from the Navy List and 
sell them.67  The second was Section 493, which allowed the 
Navy to sell auxiliary vessels “unsuited to the present needs of 
the Navy.”68 
When Jackson initially gave President Roosevelt a 
tentative green light to transfer the destroyers without specific 
congressional authorization, he planned to use Sections 491 
and 492.69  This initial plan, however, fell completely apart 
when the Chief of Naval Operations refused to certify that the 
destroyers were “unfit for further service” as required by 
Section 491.70  Jackson‟s fall-back position was to rely solely 
upon Section 492.71  The Preliminary Draft, which is the 
subject of the present essay, was written after the Chief of 
Naval Operations refused to go along with the idea of striking 
the destroyers from the naval list.72  Jackson‟s sole reliance 
 
66. S. REP. NO. 76-1946, at 7-8 (1940).  Accord Memorandum from 
Newman A. Townsend, supra note 53. 
67. 34 U.S.C. §§ 491-92 (1940).  In 1956, Congress repealed Title 34, 
which dealt solely with the Navy, and merged the repealed provisions into 
Title 10, which deals with all the armed forces.  Citations to Title 34 in the 
present article refer to the 1940 edition of the United States Code. 
68. Id. § 493.  See also supra note 67.  In fact, the Navy never used 
Section 493 to dispose of even auxiliary vessels.  See Diary of Oscar Cox (July 
12, 1940), in OSCAR COX PAPERS (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde Park, N.Y.) (relating advice from 
Admiral Ray Spear). 
69. See LEUTZE, supra note 5, at 117-19.  See also Memorandum 
Regarding Old Destroyers (Aug. 15, 1940), in ROBERT HOUGHWOUT JACKSON 
PAPERS, supra note 22.  The memorandum is unsigned but was likely written 
by Newman A. Townsend and Green Hackworth.  Hackworth was the Legal 
Advisor to the Department of State.  For support of Townsend‟s and 
Hackworth‟s likely authorship of the memorandum, see Jackson, supra note 
33, at 96. 
70. Memorandum from Chief of Naval Operations Stark to Navy 
Secretary Knox, with Addenda (Aug. 17, 1940), discussed in LEUTZE, supra 
note 5, at 117-19.  Apparently, this valuable memorandum was lost in the 
mid-1990s, when the Chief of Naval Operation‟s files for 1938-41 were 
transferred from the U.S. Naval Historical Center to the National Archives.  
See SHOGAN, supra note 5, at 298 n.216. 
71. See infra app. at pp. 390-92.  Accord Acquisition of Naval and Air 
Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att‟y Gen. 484, 489 
(1940). 
72. The Preliminary Draft is based solely upon Section 492, but cites 
both Sections 491 and 492.  See infra app. at p. 392.  Someone later noticed 
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upon Section 492 was, at best, dubious.  Until Chief of Naval 
Operations Stark refused to go along with Jackson‟s initial 
approach, every lawyer who considered the issue, including 
Jackson himself, believed that Section 492 could not be used 
unless the ships were struck from the Navy List.73  Whoever 
put together the Preliminary Draft undoubtedly understood the 
weaknesses of the Section 492 argument and in the analysis of 
the Espionage Act.  Accordingly, the drafter prefaced his 
analysis with the thought that: “In view of your constitutional 
power as Chief Executive and as Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy, many authorities hold that the Congress could 
not by statute limit your authority in this respect.  I find it 
unnecessary, however, to pass upon that question.”74  It is 
unclear who came up with this claim of preclusive authority.  
Jackson‟s notes for his unpublished law review article suggest 
that the general idea came from Secretary of War Stimson.75 
The basic problem with the Preliminary Draft‟s claim of 
preclusive power is that the authorities quoted or cited in the 
draft gave scant support to the proposition.  To be sure, the 
President clearly has exclusive power over a few specific 
foreign affairs issues.  Under the Constitution, only the 
President may nominate officers subject to Senate 
confirmation,76 and only the President may negotiate treaties, 
subject of course, to Senate approval.77  There also is a 
 
this discrepancy and struck Section 491 from the draft. 
73. Memorandum from Benjamin Cohen, supra note 46, at 2; 
Memorandum from Newman A. Townsend, supra note 53.  For Jackson‟s 
initial position, see supra notes 52-56, 69-71 and accompanying text.  When 
Cohen and Acheson wrote their letter, they struck all reference to Sections 
491 and 492, presumably because they believed that a finding that the ships 
were “unfit for further service” was impossible.  See Acheson et al., supra 
note 51. 
74. See infra app. at p. 390. 
75. In some preliminary notes, Jackson wrote, “The opinion -- not rest on 
Stimson ground inherent power -- Letter of five -- Statutory only . . . Domestic 
law -- not go on inherent powers -- no danger.”  Untitled preliminary notes for 
law review article, in ROBERT HOUGHWOUT JACKSON PAPERS, supra note 22. 
76. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  One of the sources cited in the 
Preliminary Draft notes this particular exclusive power.  See Warren, infra 
app. note 119. 
77. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  A number of the sources cited in the 
Preliminary Draft adduced the President‟s treaty power as an example of 
exclusive executive power.  See HYDE, infra app. note 114; MOORE, infra app. 
note 117; POMEROY, infra app. note 108; WILLOUGHBY, infra app. note 121; 
WRIGHT, infra app. note 122. 
13
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consensus that the President has exclusive power to recognize 
foreign governments.78  These narrow categories, however, are 
based upon specific constitutional language and in no way 
support a general constitutional authority to ignore 
congressional mandates.  There also is a consensus that only 
the President may communicate officially with foreign 
governments,79 but this is a rule of procedure and not a 
substantive Presidential power.  At best, the Preliminary 
Draft‟s quotation of the Curtiss-Wright case supports this 
procedural power.80  One of the quoted authorities81 embraced a 
broad preclusive power stemming from the Commander in 
Chief Clause,82 but the Preliminary Draft takes no notice of 
this separate argument.83 
The long list of authorities cited in the Preliminary Draft 
was initially adduced in support of the President‟s unilateral 
power to acquire base rights, and there was no relevant act of 
Congress on this issue.  In Jackson‟s Steel Seizure opinion, he 
later referred to this type of issue as a “zone of twilight” in 
which the President and Congress may have concurrent 
authority.  A number of the authorities in the Preliminary 
Draft relied upon occasions in which Presidents took bold 
action in the absence of congressional guidance.84  President 
Jefferson‟s Louisiana Purchase85 and President Lincoln‟s 
 
78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  A number of the sources cited in the 
Preliminary Draft adduced the President‟s recognition power as an example 
of exclusive executive power.  See WILLOUGHBY, infra app. note 121; WRIGHT, 
infra app. note 122; Warren, infra app. note 119.  See also MOORE, infra app. 
note 117. 
79. See HENKIN, supra note 3, at 41-45, 81-82.  A number of the sources 
cited in the Preliminary Draft adduced the President‟s power to communicate 
officially with foreign nations as an example of exclusive executive power.  
See CORWIN, infra app. note 111; MATHEWS, infra app. note 116; MOORE, infra 
app. note 117; POMEROY, infra app. note 108; WILLOUGHBY, infra app. note 
121; WRIGHT, infra app. note 122; Warren, infra app. note 119.  See also 
HAMILTON, supra note 2; CASTO, supra note 2, at 62-63 (discussing Hamilton‟s 
Pacificus No. 1). 
80. See infra app. note 124 and accompanying text. 
81. See POMEROY, infra app. note 108 and accompanying text. 
82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
83. See infra app. note 108 and accompanying text. 
84. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804) (discussed infra app. note 
123); DE CHAMBRUN, infra app. note 109; LATANÉ, infra app. note 115; 
ROOSEVELT, infra app. note 107. 
85. See LATANÉ, infra app. note 115. 
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actions at the onset of the Civil War86 were particularly 
dramatic examples.  None of the authorities, however, support 
a general Presidential power to ignore acts of Congress.87  Even 
with respect to the dramatic actions of Presidents Jefferson 
and Lincoln, the authorities note that each President sought 
and obtained congressional ratification.88  The Draft‟s 
prominent quotation from President Theodore Roosevelt ends 
with the clear statement that he could not take action that 
“was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.”89  In this 
context, the President clearly meant “laws” to encompass acts 
of Congress.90 
About a week after the Preliminary Draft was prepared, 
Jackson gave President Roosevelt a near-final draft for 
review.91  This draft deleted almost all of the authorities on 
presidential power that were quoted and cited in the 
Preliminary Draft, but retained the argument of a general 
foreign affairs power relevant to the President‟s authority to 
acquire base rights.  To repeat, however, the issue of 
concurrent authority to acquire base rights spoke to the second 
Steel Seizure category in which there was no conflict between 
the President and Congress.  When Jackson turned to the 
President‟s authority to dispose of the vessels, the idea of a 
general presidential authority to ignore congressional 
directives was completely gone. 
Although Jackson dropped the suggestion of a broad claim 
of preclusive presidential power, we do not know why he did so.  
Perhaps he wished to avoid a political dispute with Congress.  
Congressional relations were certainly a consideration, but 
Jackson did not drop a somewhat similar, in-your-face, 
 
86. See DE CHAMBRUN, infra app. note 109.  See also Barron & 
Lederman, supra note 19, at 993-1005. 
87. See infra app. notes 106-23. 
88. See DE CHAMBRUN, infra app. note 109; LATANÉ, infra app. note 115.  
In Steel Seizure, Jackson wrote that “The oft-cited Louisiana Purchase had 
nothing to do with the separation of powers as between the President and 
Congress, but only with the state and federal power.”  Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 
579, 638 n.5 (1952). 
89. See ROOSEVELT, infra app. note 107 and accompanying text. 
90. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1035. 
91. Robert Houghwout Jackson, Draft Opinion Regarding the Sale of 
Over-Age Destroyers to Great Britain (Aug. 23, 1940), in ROBERT 
HOUGHWOUT JACKSON PAPERS, supra note 22.  See also Jackson, supra note 33 
at 97-98. 
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argument from the near-final draft opinion that he showed the 
President.92 
Seven years later, when he was on the Supreme Court, 
Jackson evinced a deep, personal mistrust of broad 
interpretations of war powers.  He bluntly explained that, 
 
No one will question that this power is the 
most dangerous one to free government in the 
whole catalogue of powers.  It usually is invoked 
in haste and excitement when calm legislative 
consideration of constitutional limitation is 
difficult.  It is executed in a time of patriotic 
fervor that makes moderation unpopular.93 
 
We may reasonably assume that Jackson would have been 
leery of a constitutional doctrine that would eviscerate the 
doctrine of separation of powers when the Executive invokes 
the President‟s foreign affairs and Commander-in-Chief 
powers.  In Steel Seizure, he denied that his Destroyers-for-
 
92. In dealing with the Espionage Act, Benjamin Cohen had concluded 
that, because the Act was a criminal statute whose terms did not expressly 
apply to government action, the Act should be limited to private citizens.  
Memorandum from Benjamin Cohen, supra note 46, at 11-12.  There was 
good precedent for this interpretive strategy, and some very sophisticated 
people believed that Cohen‟s approach was the strongest argument.  See 
Quincy Wright, The Transfer of Destroyers to Great Britain, 34 AM. J. INT‟L L. 
680, 683-84 (1940); Letter from Manley Hudson to Charles Burlingham (Nov. 
12, 1940), in BENJAMIN V. COHEN PAPERS, supra note 8.  See also James W. 
Ryan, Address to the American Bar Association Section of International Law 
(Sept. 10, 1940), in 86 CONG. REC. app. 5600-01 (1940). 
In late August, Benjamin Cohen wrote, “I wholly agree that the 
[Espionage Act] does not prevent sending the destroyers out of the country by 
the Government itself.”  Draft Letter sent as an attachment from Benjamin 
Cohen to Dean Acheson (Aug. 27, 1940), in BENJAMIN COHEN PAPERS, supra 
note 8 [hereinafter Draft Letter from Benjamin Cohen].  Cohen went on to 
explain that he and Acheson deleted this argument from their N.Y. Times 
letter, see Acheson et al., supra note 51; supra note 48 and accompanying 
text, because this “view seemed to us calculated to produce the protest that 
we were putting the Government above the law and suggesting that it do 
what its citizens were forbidden to do.”  Draft Letter from Benjamin Cohen, 
supra.  See also Letter from Benjamin Cohen to Dean Acheson (Aug. 17, 
1940), in BENJAMIN COHEN PAPERS, supra note 8 (stating that “we feared [this 
view] might provoke more political as well as legal protest than the 
suggestion we made”). 
93. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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Bases opinion relied upon preclusive presidential authority94 
and restated his mistrust of broad war powers: 
 
[N]o doctrine that the Court could promulgate 
would seem to me more sinister and alarming 
than that a President whose conduct of foreign 
affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even 
is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over 
the internal affairs of the country by his own 
commitment of the Nation‟s armed forces to some 
foreign venture.95 
 
Finally, Jackson‟s response to Professor Edward Corwin‟s 
critique of Jackson‟s final and official Destroyer opinion casts 
some light on the matter.  On the narrow issue of presidential 
authority to acquire bases, Jackson quoted the Curtiss-Wright 
dictum, recognizing a “very delicate, plenary, and exclusive 
power of the President as the sole organ of the Federal 
Government in the field of international relations—a power 
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of 
Congress.”96  In a fit of near hysteria, Corwin shrieked, “[n]o 
such dangerous opinion was ever before penned by an Attorney 
General of the United States.”97  He asked, “why may not any 
and all of the Congress‟s specifically delegated powers be set 
aside . . . and the country be put on a totalitarian basis without 
further ado?”98  Of course, Jackson made no such claim.  His 
discussion of the President‟s constitutional power dealt solely 
with an issue in which there was not the slightest hint of a 
conflict between the President and the Congress.  Corwin 
simply misread Jackson‟s opinion.99 
 
94. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 645 n.14 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
95. Id. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Jackson was referring to 
President Truman‟s unilateral commitment of the armed forces to the Korean 
War. 
96. Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age 
Destroyers, 39 Op. Att‟y Gen. 484, 486 (1940) (quoting United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)).  See also infra app. 
at note 124 and accompanying text. 
97. Corwin, supra note 21. 
98. Id. 
99. Although Corwin was a great scholar, he was not a careful reader of 
legal texts.  For another failure by Corwin to understand an important legal 
17
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A decade later, Jackson still remembered, and obviously 
resented, Corwin‟s strident attack.  Although the Preliminary 
Draft of the Destroyers opinion had included a claim similar to 
Corwin‟s allegation, this extreme language was stripped from 
the final opinion.  In an early draft of Jackson‟s law review 
article, he bluntly stated in specific response to Corwin‟s 
charges, that “[t]he fact was that the opinion expressly avoided 
reliance for its conclusion on inherent, implied or independent 
constitutional powers of the presidential office . . . .  The ruling 
was that he could go as far as Congress authorized and no 
farther.”100 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As the Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s opinion in the 
Destroyer Deal demonstrates, the idea of a broad, preclusive 
Executive power based upon the President‟s foreign affairs and 
Commander-in-Chief powers has been around for a long time.  
Not until recently, however, has a high officer in the federal 
government formally embraced this sweeping concept.  
Certainly the idea did not reach the final draft of Jackson‟s 
opinion.  Why did Jackson not use the preclusive power 
argument in his final opinion?  Undoubtedly, there were 
political reasons.  After all, the opinion was a political 
document.101  But Jackson had to have had serious legal 
reservations as well. 
Not a single source cited in the Preliminary Draft—neither 
the quotations nor the hideous string cite—supported the 
claimed general principle of preclusive power.  Indeed, some of 
the sources flatly denied the principle.  During the undeclared 
naval war with France, the Supreme Court held that, in the 
context of a direct conflict between an act of Congress and a 
presidential order, that the Congress could micromanage a 
 
argument, see CASTO, supra note 2, at 68-74, 179-80. 
100. Jackson, supra note 22.  Jackson subsequently deleted this section 
from his draft.  Presumably he wisely decided not to engage in polemics with 
his critics. 
101. In Steel Seizure, Jackson later confessed that one of his Attorney 
General advisory opinions was “partisan advocacy.”  Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 
579, 649 n.17 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/15
382 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
naval campaign.102  Likewise, the first President Roosevelt had 
a quite expansive view of the President‟s constitutional powers, 
but he clearly stated that the President‟s acts were subject to 
congressional control.103 
 
 
 
102. See infra app. note 123. 
103. See ROOSEVELT, infra app. note 107 and accompanying text.  See 
also WRIGHT, infra app. note 122; infra app. note 122 and accompanying text. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion104 
 
The President 
I have the honor to refer to your request for my opinion 
concerning a question which has arisen in connection with a 
proposed exchange of certain old destroyers of the United 
States Navy for naval and air bases in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
I understand that the government of Great Britain has 
proposed to grant to the United States seven naval and air 
bases in the Western Hemisphere in exchange for fifty old 
destroyers to be transferred by the United States to the 
Canadian Government; and that the Chief of Naval Operations 
of the United States Navy is of the opinion that due to the 
strategic value of such naval and air bases the proposed 
exchange will result in the strengthening of the total defense of 
the United States.  I also understand that the Chief of Naval 
Operations has, or will, certify that in view of the acquisition of 
such naval and air bases [and of their value in connection with 
the national defense,]105 the destroyers which it is proposed to 
exchange for them are not essential to the defense of the 
United States.  You request my opinion whether under these 
circumstances you are authorized to direct the proper officials 
of the United States Government to effect the exchange. 
The Constitution vests the Executive power in the 
President. (Const., Art. 2, sec. 1)  Eminent authorities have 
 
104. Preliminary Draft of Jackson‟s Opinion, supra note 8 (as reprinted 
in this Appendix).  The original document can be found in the Benjamin V. 
Cohen Papers in the Library of Congress.  All footnotes found within this 
reprint of the Preliminary Draft are editorial inserts by the present author.  
Cohen participated in drafting Attorney General Jackson‟s opinion.  See 
Jackson, supra note 33, at 96.  The Preliminary Draft was prepared sometime 
after August 16, 1940 and before August 27, 1940, when Jackson released his 
final opinion.  In order to establish the President‟s statutory authority to 
transfer the destroyers, Jackson initially planned to rely upon Sections 491 
and 492 of Title 34 of the United States Code.  On August 16, however, the 
Chief of Naval Operations refused to make a finding of fact crucial to 
Jackson‟s original plan.  See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.  The 
Chief of Naval Operation‟s refusal forced Jackson to rely upon a much weaker 
argument based solely upon a proviso to Section 492. 
105. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions. 
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long held that in the field of foreign relations the Executive‟s 
power is both complete and exclusive.  Thomas Jefferson said 
that “The transaction of business with foreign nations is 
Executive altogether.” (Writings of Thomas Jefferson 
(Memorial Edition). Vol. III, p. 16)106  President Theodore 
Roosevelt, in his autobiography (pp. 388-389),107 said: 
 
*** My view was that every executive officer, and 
above all every executive officer in high position, 
was a steward of the people bound actively and 
affirmatively to do all he could for the people, 
and not to content himself with the negative 
merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a 
napkin.  I declined to adopt the view that what 
was imperatively necessary for the Nation could 
not be done by the President unless he could find 
some specific authorization to do it.  My belief 
was that it was not only his right but his duty to 
do anything that the needs of the Nation 
demanded unless such action was forbidden by 
the Constitution or by the laws. 
 
Professor Pomeroy, in his work entitled “Constitutional 
Law of the United States (75th Ed., p.                ),108 says: 
 
106. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Question Whether the Senate 
has the Right to Negative the Grade of Persons Appointed by the Executive to 
Fill Foreign Missions, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 16 (Albert 
Bergh ed., 1907).  For the current edition, see 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 378, 379 (Julian Boyd ed., 1961).  In this opinion, Jefferson simply 
advised that the Senate, by itself, had no power to set the grade to which a 
diplomat shall be appointed.  The opinion is quite silent on the powers of the 
Congress. 
107. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 388-89 (1913).  The last 
sentence of the quotation makes clear that he is referring to an expansive 
concurrent power that could not be exercised in violation of “the laws,” i.e., 
acts of Congress.  Accord Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1034-37. 
108. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 565 (10th ed. 1888).  The draft‟s citation to the 
seventy-fifth edition is a typo.  The 1888 tenth edition is the last edition of 
Pomeroy‟s book.  The quoted language appears in Section 672 of the book, 
and refers solely to the President‟s powers to communicate with foreign 
nations and to negotiate treaties. 
In other portions of his treatise, to which the Preliminary Draft neither cites 
nor alludes, Pomeroy made sweeping claims of broad and unreviewable 
21
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*** the Executive Department, by means of this 
branch of its power over foreign relations, holds 
in its keeping the safety, welfare, and even 
permanence of our internal and domestic 
institutions.  And in wielding this power it is 
untrammeled by any other department of the 
Government; no other influence than a moral one 
can control or curb it; its acts are political, and 
its responsibility is only political. 
 
In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 137, Mr. Chief Justice 
Marshall said: 
 
*** the president is invested with certain 
important political powers, in the exercise of 
which he is to use his own discretion, and is 
accountable only to his country in his political 
character, and to his own conscience. 
 
Other authority on this subject are Chambrun, The 
Executive Power in the United States (1874), p.           ;109 
Conklin, The Power of the Executive Department (1866), p.           
 ; 110Corwin, The President‟s Control of Foreign Relations 
 
presidential power stemming from the Commander-in-Chief Clause.  See id. 
§§ 455-456, 703-706.  See also Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1019-21 
(discussing these sections).  Pomeroy‟s analysis is highly suspect today 
because it was based upon an unworkable assumption that all presidential 
and congressional powers are mutually exclusive.  See id. at 1019-20.  Today, 
and in Jackson‟s time, virtually everyone believes that the President and 
Congress have significant powers that overlap each other.  See HENKIN, supra 
note 3, at 94. 
109. ADOLPHE DE CHAMBRUN, THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE UNITED 
STATES: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (M. Dahlgren trans., 1874).  De 
Chambrun makes no reference to direct conflicts between the Congress and 
the President.  In the relevant portion of his text, he concentrates upon the 
President‟s power to respond to foreign and domestic attacks.  Id. at ch. 5.  
He gives detailed attention to President Lincoln‟s unilateral response to the 
beginning of the Civil War, but specifically notes that Lincoln‟s actions were 
ratified by Congress.  Id. at 120.  See also id. at 122-23. 
110. ALFRED CONKLING, THE POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1866).  Conkling makes no reference 
to direct conflicts between the Congress and the President.  He does not 
discuss the President‟s foreign affairs powers but does discuss the President‟s 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/15
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(1917), p.           ;111 Elliot‟s Debate, Vol. 4, p.         ;112 Hamilton, 
The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Vol. 7, pp. 77-117;113 Hyde, 
International Law, Vol. 2 (1922), p.         ;114 Latané, American 
Foreign Policy (1927), p.        ;115 Matthews, The Conduct of 
 
Commander-in-Chief powers.  Id. at 80-88.  He further notes that his 
discussion of these powers applies “only in war.”  Id. at 83 (emphasis in 
original).  Even in time of war, Conkling makes no mention of a direct conflict 
between the Congress and the President. 
111. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT‟S CONTROL OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (1917).  Corwin makes no reference to direct conflicts between the 
President and the Congress.  He does, however, emphatically state that “the 
President is the organ of diplomatic intercourse with other states . . . [and] 
this power is presumptively his alone . . . [and] his discretion in its discharge 
is not legally subject to any other organ of government.”  Id. at 35-36.  There 
is nothing in Corwin‟s book to indicate that the President‟s foreign affairs and 
Commander-in-Chief powers cloak the Executive with a broad ranging 
authority to disregard acts of Congress.  When Jackson‟s final opinion was 
published, Corwin misread the opinion as claiming such a power, and he 
vehemently rejected the idea.  See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying 
text. 
112. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1876).  This 
is a ridiculous throw-away cite.  The author of the present essay is not aware 
of any passages in the five volumes of Elliot’s Debates that speak directly to 
an Executive power to ignore acts of Congress. 
113. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Pacificus No. 1 (1793), in 7 THE WORKS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 77-117 (John C. Hamilton ed., 1851).  Hamilton‟s 
Pacificus No. 1 is a brilliant discussion of the President‟s broad, concurrent 
powers in the realm of foreign affairs.  See CASTO, supra note 2, at chs. 5, 10.  
Hamilton did not even address the possibility of the President acting contrary 
to an act of Congress, but did, however, note that, although the President had 
a concurrent, unilateral power to declare neutrality, the President‟s 
declaration would not be binding on the Congress.  See HAMILTON, supra, at 
75-76. 
114. 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS 
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES (1922).  Professor Hyde 
makes no mention of direct conflicts between the President and Congress.  He 
notes that the President has significant unilateral authority to enter into 
agreements other than treaties with foreign countries.  Id. §§ 505-09.  He 
does not suggest, however, that Congress cannot limit the President‟s 
authority in this regard.  Professor Hyde does note that only the President 
and his agents may negotiate and ratify a treaty.  Id. § 517. 
115. JOHN HOLLADAY LATANÉ, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
(1927).  The only even barely relevant part of Professor Latané‟s history is his 
mention that Thomas Jefferson approved the Louisiana Purchase 
notwithstanding qualms that there was no constitutional authority for the 
acquisition.  Id. at 109-10.  This political precedent was not strictly relevant 
to the acquisition of bases because the Louisiana Purchase was submitted to 
Congress and the Senate for approval.  Id. at 110.  Accord Acquisition of 
Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att‟y Gen. 
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American Foreign Relations (1922), p.        ;116 Moore, 
International Law Digest (1906), p.         ;117 Oppenheim, 
International Law, 4th Ed. (McNair, 1926), Vol. 2, p.           ;118 
Warren, Presidential Declarations of Independence (1930), p. 
 ;119 Wheaton, International Law (6th English Ed., Keith, 
1929), Vol. 2, p. ;120 Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the 
 
484, 488 (1940) (opinion written by Attorney General Jackson). 
116. JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (1922).  Professor Mathews makes no mention of a direct conflict 
between the President and the Congress.  He does explain that Congress has 
typically deferred to the President in respect of foreign relations.  See id. at 3-
21.  He also notes Representative John Marshall‟s argument that “The 
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole 
representative with foreign relations.”  Id. at 22 (internal citation omitted).  
Mathews limits the “sole organ” power, however, to communications between 
the United States and foreign nations.  See id. at 21-26 (quoting Marshall). 
117. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1906).  
Professor Moore‟s work is what it says it is: a digest of various statements, 
diplomatic and judicial precedents, and diplomatic incidents.  He recites 
various precedents on the President‟s power to recognize foreign states.  Id. 
at 243-48 (vol. I).  He does the same on the issue of who speaks 
internationally for the United States.  Id. at 680-83 (vol. IV).  Finally, he 
briefly covers the rule that the Executive negotiates treaties.  Id. at 179-80 
(vol. 5). 
118. 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Arnold McNair ed., 4th 
ed. 1926).  This was a leading treatise on international law and as such, 
devoted virtually no space to domestic law issues like the allocation of power 
within a particular country.  Parts I and II of Volume Two deal with the 
“Settlement of Disputes between States and with War.”  Part III, on 
“Neutrality,” was relevant to the legality of the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal 
under international law, but offered no guidance whatsoever on the 
President‟s powers under the Constitution. 
119. Charles Warren, Presidential Declarations of Independence, 10 B.U. 
L. REV. 1 (1930).  This interesting article by a gifted legal historian 
documents numerous disputes between the President and Congress in 
respect of foreign affairs issues.  All the disputes involved fairly technical 
issues such as the President as the sole organ of communications with foreign 
governments, the President‟s exclusive power to nominate officers subject to 
Senate confirmation, the President‟s exclusive power to recognize foreign 
governments, and the President‟s power to control foreign service officers.  
None of these disputes involved a general claim to ignore acts of Congress. 
120. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (A. Berriedale 
Keith ed., 6th ed. 1929).  Wheaton‟s work is an international law treatise 
organized much like Oppenheim‟s.  See supra app. note 119.  Chapters I-IV 
deal with war and belligerents, Chapter V treats neutrality, and Chapters VI 
and VII cover enforcement of the laws of war and peace treaties.  Like 
Oppenheim, Wheaton addresses international law principles relevant to the 
transfer of the destroyers but is silent on the internal allocation of authority 
within a country. 
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United States (2d Ed., 1929), Vol. 1, p.                  ;121 Wright, 
Control of our Foreign Relations (1927), p.        ;122 Little v. 
Barreme, 2 Cranch. 169.123 
The principle announced by the above authorities was 
aptly summarized by Mr. Justice Sutherland who, in United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 3, held that the 
 
121. 1 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929).  Professor Willoughby makes no reference 
to the idea that the President‟s foreign-affairs and commander-in-chief 
powers include a general power to ignore acts of Congress.  See Barron & 
Lederman, supra note 19, at 1025 n.334.  He does, however, point to some 
limited instances where the President‟s power is usually deemed to be 
exclusive and beyond formal congressional control.  These include the 
negotiation and ratification of Treaties, see WILLOUGHBY, supra, §§ 284, 289, 
the recognition of foreign governments, id. § 293, and communications with 
foreign governments, id. §§ 522, 537-38. 
122. QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 
(1922).  Professor Wright recognized that the President is the sole organ of 
official communications between the United States and foreign countries.  Id. 
§§ 12-17.  He also stated that the Executive is the department that negotiates 
treaties, id. §§ 176, 252, and recognizes foreign nations, id. §§ 192-95.  Insofar 
as direct conflicts between a President‟s desires and an act of Congress are 
concerned, Professor Wright generally endorsed the traditional American 
doctrine of legislative supremacy.  Id. §§ 246, 252.  Of course, Congress could 
not regulate the President‟s exercise of the comparatively narrow range of 
foreign powers vested exclusively in the Executive. 
 Similarly, Wright wrote that the Commander-in-Chief Clause vested the 
President with exclusive authority over “the command of the forces and the 
conduct of [military] campaigns.”  Id. § 221 (quoting Ex Parte Milligan, 71 
U.S. 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, J., concurring)).  See Barron & Lederman, supra 
note 19, at 1018-19.  Wright discussed Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804), 
see infra app. note 123, elsewhere in his book, see WRIGHT, supra, §§ 104, 218, 
but made no attempt to reconcile Little with the President‟s power to 
command forces and conduct military campaigns. 
 Wright supported the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal in public and private, but 
never hinted that the Deal could be justified by a preclusive constitutional 
authority.  See Wright, supra note 92; Letter from Quincy Wright to Charles 
C. Burlingham, supra note 21. 
123. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804).  The case is a classic example 
of legislative micromanagement of military operations.  During the 
undeclared naval war with France, Congress enacted a statute to the effect 
that the Navy could seize ships sailing to French ports but not from French 
ports.  The President, however, directed the seizure of ships sailing both to 
and from French ports.  The Court noted that, in the absence of pertinent 
acts of Congress, the President‟s duty to enforce law and his commander-in-
chief power give him a general authority to direct the Navy to seize ships 
engaged in illicit commerce.  Id. at 177.  The Court held, however, that when 
Congress has enacted a rule regulating the authority of Navy vessels to seize 
ships, the President lacks authority to contravene the statutory rule.  Id. at 
177-78. 
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Executive‟s power in the field of foreign relations is “a very 
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the 
sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations—a power which does not require as a 
basis for its exercise an act of Congress.”124 
In the exercise of this power the Executive has not 
hesitated in the past to acquire territory and concessions from 
foreign nations without express congressional authority.  
Notable examples in this field were the Louisiana Purchase in 
     , the purchase of Florida in          , and the acquisition of 
the Panama Canal Zone in           .  In all of these instances, 
and in many others, the President acted without authority 
from the Congress, relying solely upon his constitutional 
authority. 
In view of the above, it is my opinion that you have full 
authority to acquire the naval and air bases if in your opinion 
such bases are essential to the defense of the United States or 
their acquisition is otherwise in the interest of the people of the 
United States.  The only question remaining is whether in 
acquiring these bases you have a right to direct that old 
destroyers of the United States Navy be transferred in 
exchange for them.  Since the power to acquire includes the 
power to give compensation, you unquestionably have such 
authority unless the congress in the exercise of constitutional 
 
124. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 
(1936) involved Congress‟s constitutional power to delegate authority to the 
President to declare an embargo on the sale of arms to countries engaged in a 
bloody and seemingly pointless war in South America.  See William Casto, 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 107 (David Tanenhaus ed., 2008); H. 
Jefferson Powell, The Story of Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, in 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 195, 195-232 (Christopher Schroeder & Curtis 
Bradley eds., 2009).  Among other things, the congressional delegation 
required the President to consult with and seek the cooperation of other 
countries before deciding whether an embargo would be appropriate.  Curtis-
Wright, 299 U.S. at 312 (quoting H.R.J. Res. 347, 73rd Cong. (1934)).  The 
Court‟s reference to “the President as the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations” was based upon John 
Marshall‟s well known speech in the House of Representatives.  Id. at 320.  In 
other words, the Curtiss-Wright quote is simply a restatement of the well-
established doctrine that the President is the sole organ for communicating 
with foreign nations.  Given the need for communicating with other nations, 
a presidential authority to implement the Act‟s embargo provisions made a 
good deal of sense. 
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power has enacted legislation prohibiting the proposed transfer 
of destroyers. 
In view of your constitutional power as Chief Executive 
and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, many 
authorities hold that the Congress could not by statute limit 
your authority in this respect.  I find it unnecessary, however, 
to pass upon that question.  By section 5 of the act of March 3, 
1883, 22 Stat. 599 (sec. 492, title 34, U.S.C.), the Congress has 
expressly authorized the disposition of vessels of the Navy, and 
I think the authority contained in that statute is broad enough 
to include the transfer of destroyers here proposed.  True, the 
first part of that statute prescribes the usual and ordinary 
methods of disposition by the Secretary of the Navy, after 
appraisal and advertisement [of vessels which have been found 
unfit for further use and have been stricken from the navy 
register.]125 but the last clause of the statute provides that 
“except as otherwise provided by law no vessel of the Navy 
shall hereafter be sold in any manner then herein provided, or 
for less than such appraised value, unless the President of the 
United States shall otherwise direct in writing.” (Underscoring 
supplied)  Construing this clause the Supreme Court in 
Levinson v. United States, 258 U.S. 198, held that under it “the 
power of the President to direct a departure from the statute is 
not confined to a sale for less than the appraised value but 
extends to the manner of the sale.”  The Court further held 
that “the word „unless‟ qualifies both the requirements of the 
concluding clause.” 
I find no statute which expressly repeals section 5 of the 
Act of March 3, 1883, nor do I find any which in my opinion 
repeals it by implication.  It may be suggested that section 
14(a) of Public No. 671, approved June 28, 1940, contains such 
an implied repeal, but I am unable to agree with that view.  
That section reads as follows: 
 
Notwithstanding the provision of any other 
law, no military or naval weapon, ship, boat, 
aircraft, munitions, supplies, or equipment, to 
which the United States has title, in whole or in 
part, or which have been contracted for, shall 
 
125. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions. 
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hereafter be transferred, exchanged, sold, or 
otherwise disposed of in any manner whatsoever 
unless the Chief of Naval Operations in the case 
of naval material, and the Chief of Staff of the 
Army in the case of military materials, shall first 
certify that such material is not essential to the 
defense of the United States. 
 
It is well settled that implied repeals are not favored and 
will not be recognized unless the provisions of the latter act are 
clearly in conflict with the provisions of the former. (cite 
authorities) I find no such conflict between section 14(a) of 
Public No. 671 and section 5 of the set of March 3, 1883.  The 
more reasonable view is that section 14(a) produces no conflict 
but merely creates an additional requirement.  This view is 
supported by the history of section 7 of Public No. 757, 
approved July 19, 1940 (subsequent to the enactment of section 
14(a) above), which reads as follows: 
 
No vessel, ship, or boat (except ships‟ boats) 
now in the United States Navy or being built or 
hereafter built therefor shall be disposed of by 
sale or otherwise, or be chartered or scrapped, 
except as now provided by law. 
 
As passed by the House, section 7 of the bill which became 
Public No. 757 read as follows: 
 
No vessel, ship, or boat now in the United 
States Navy, or being built therefor, shall be 
disposed of by sale or otherwise, or be chartered 
or scrapped, without the consent of the 
Congress.” 
 
The Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate amended 
the section to read as it now appears in the act, and in 
reporting to the Senate on the section said [(S Rept.            ):]126 
 
 
126. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions. 
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The Committee were informed that this 
section as approved by the House of 
Representatives would prevent the Navy 
Department from disposing of small ships‟ boats 
without the consent of the Congress.  Admiral 
Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, suggested that 
this section be deleted from the bill and stated 
that in his opinion other provisions of law 
regarding the sale and disposal of naval vessels 
were adequate. 
 
The report then “quoted” as “existing laws on this subject” 
section 14(a) of Public No. 671, 76th Cong., approved June 28, 
1940, and sections 491 and 492 of title 34, U.S.C. [5 of the act 
of March 3, 1883.]127 
It is my opinion, therefore, that section 5 of the set of 
March 3, 1883, is still controlling, subject, of course, to the 
additional requirement imposed by section 14(a) of Public No. 
671, approved June 28, 1940. 
Under both the language of section 5 of the set of March 3, 
1883, and the construction placed thereon by the Supreme 
Court, the power of the President to dispose resale of the [old 
destroyers]128 Navy in such manner and under such terms and 
conditions as he deems best for the interests of the United 
States is unlimited, except in so far as it may now be limited by 
the requirements of section 14(a) of Public No. 671, approved 
June 28, 1940, [and]129 You state that the provisions of that 
section have been or will be complied with. 
The national defense is of extreme importance to the U.S. 
and to its people.  It is the constitutional duty of the President 
at all times to take such action as he deems necessary to assure 
the adequacy of that defense.  This duty is no less in time of 
peace than in time of war.  Unquestionably it is at the present 
time imperative.  It follows that if in your opinion an exchange 
of the old destroyers for naval and air bases in accordance with 
the proposal of the Government of Great Britain will enhance 
 
127. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions that replaced the 
marked-out words. 
128. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions. 
129. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions. 
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or increase the total defense of the U.S., you are not only vested 
with full authority but you are also charged with the 
constitutional duty to direct the proper officer of the U.S. Govt. 
to effect the change. 
This view is not in conflict with my recent memorandum to 
you holding [advising]130 that the sale and delivery of motor 
torpedo boats by an American builder to a belligerent 
government would be in conflict with section 3 of title 5 V of 
the [Espionage]131 act of June 15, 1917 (sec. 33, title 18, 
U.S.C.).  That memorandum dealt only with torpedo boats 
constructed by American builders to the order of a belligerent 
government.  The statute involved reads: 
 
During a war in which the United States is a 
neutral nation, it shall be unlawful to send out of 
the jurisdiction of the United States any vessel 
built, armed, or equipped as a vessel of war, or 
converted from a private vessel into a vessel of 
war, with any intent or under any agreement or 
contract, written or oral, that such vessel shall be 
delivered to a belligerent nation, or to an agent, 
officer, or citizen of such nation, or with 
reasonable cause to believe that the said vessel 
shall or will be employed in the service of any 
such belligerent nation after its departure from 
the jurisdiction of the United States. 
 
The legislative history of this statute shows that it was 
enacted by the Congress for the purpose of making the 
statutory law conform to international law.  In view of this fact 
[Oppenheim in his work on International Law, 5th Edition, Vol. 
2, pages 574, et seq., gives the following as the international 
law on the question:]132 
 
Whereas a neutral is in no wise obliged by 
his duty of impartiality to prevent his subjects 
from selling armed vessels to the belligerents, 
 
130. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions. 
131. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions. 
132. Words in brackets are pen and ink additions. 
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such armed vessels being merely contraband of 
war, a neutral is bound to employ the means at 
his disposal to prevent his subjects from 
building, fitting out, or arming, to the order of 
either belligerent, vessels intended to be used as 
men-of-war, and to prevent the departure from 
his jurisdiction of any vessel which, by order of 
either belligerent, has been adapted to war-like 
use.  The difference between selling armed 
vessels to belligerents and building them to order 
is usually defined in the following ways: 
 
An armed ship, being contraband of war, is 
in no wise different from other kinds of 
contraband, provided that she is not manned in a 
neutral port, so that she can commit hostilities at 
once after having reached the open sea.  A 
subject of a neutral who builds an armed ship, or 
arms a merchantman, not to the order of a 
belligerent, but intending to sell her to a 
belligerent, does not differ from a manufacturer 
of arms who intends to sell them to a belligerent.  
There is nothing to prevent a neutral from 
allowing his subjects to sell armed vessels, and to 
deliver them to belligerents, either in a neutral 
port or in a belligerent port.  In the cases of The 
La Santissima Trinidad (1822) and The Meteor 
(1866), American courts have recognized this; 
and so did the ungratified Declaration of London, 
which in Article 22 (10) enumerated as absolute 
contraband “warships, including boats, and their 
distinctive component parts.” 
 
On the other hand, if a subject of a neutral 
builds armed ships to the order of a belligerent, 
he prepares the means of naval operations, since 
the ships, on sailing outside the neutral 
territorial waters and taking in a crew and 
ammunition, can at once commit hostilities. 
Thus, through the carrying out of the order of the 
belligerent, the neutral territory has been made 
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the base of naval operation,; and as the duty of 
impartiality includes an obligation to prevent 
either belligerent from making neutral territory 
the base of military or naval operations, a 
neutral violates his neutrality by not preventing 
his subjects from carrying out an order of a 
belligerent for the building and fitting out of 
men-of-war. 
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